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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
000O000

LISA HARTWIG,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

:

Case No, 920496-CA

:
Priority No, 15

DAVID HARTWIG,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:
000O000

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent accepts Appellant's statement of the case as
an accurate synopsis of the procedural history of the case.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent (hereinafter "Plaintiff") seeks affirmance of the
Order Modifying

Decree of Divorce

and Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law entered June 29, 1992.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
Defendant's Statement of the Issues lists numerous subissues which confuse and distort actual issues on appeal.

In an

attempt to clarify those issues, defendant states as follows:
Appellant, (hereinafter "Defendant") seeks reversal of
two principle aspects of the Order Modifying the Decree of Divorce;
1)

Defendant's extended summer visitation wherein, commencing in

the summer of 1993, Defendant shall have summer visitation for two

three-week periods, continuing until each child reaches age 9. As
each child turns nine, the visitation shall increase to six weeks
with two blocks of time, with no blocks of time being longer than
one month; and 2) the daycare and preschool expenses.
With regard to the issue of summer visitation, the issue
presented for appeal is whether the Trial Court's decision is so
unjust as to represent an abuse of discretion.

(See Nilson v.

Nilson, 652 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1982), Bake v. Bake. 772 P.2d 461 (Utah
App. 1989), Maughan v. Maucrhan. 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989).
With regard to daycare and preschool expenses issue, no
standard

of

review

has

been

identified.

However,

the

"reasonableness" language in the relevant statute indicates this
Court should only disturb the decision it if determines the Trial
Court's abused its discretion.
Defendant's Objection to the Findings of Fact fails to
state any specific objection to the Findings as entered by the
Court.
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS1
In addition to the facts set forth in Appellant's brief
as "relevant Facts" Plaintiff (referred to in transcript as "Mrs.
Fithian", her married name) adds the following important testimony
and evidence from the proceedings.
1

These abbreviations are used throughout: The record as
paginated by the District Court Clerk is designated as "R"; The
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered by Judge Anne M.
Stirba, on June 29, 1992 are designated as "Findings"; the Order
Modifying Decree of Divorce, entered June 29 1992, is designated
"Order"; the Transcript of the trial proceeding is designated
"Tr.".
2

Although Defendant was regular in his exercise of
visitation with his children, at the time of trial, the longest
time he had exercised extended visitation has been nine consecutive
days,

(Tr. at 16 and 57).

This occurred when Plaintiff and

Defendant both resided in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Plaintiff testified that her proposed extended visitation
schedule (the schedule adopted in the Court's ruling) was based on
the children's well-being as it related to the Defendant's problem
with controlling his anger.

(Tr. at 30 and 31). Plaintiff also

testified that, during long term visitation, she actually feared
for the children's physical well being. (Tr. at 53).

The parties

both related an incident during the summer of 1991 when Defendant
had visitation of the boys and had a fight with his current wife.
During the course of the problem with his wife, Defendant returned
the boys to Plaintiff until his anger subsided.
31) .

(Tr. at 19 and

During the marriage, plaintiff was very concerned about

Defendant's rage.

He put a fist through the wall and has put his

head through a wall. (Tr. at 32 and 33).
In addition, Plaintiff testified that the stepped up
visitation schedule she proposed and adopted by the Court, was in
part based on the children's personalities. (Tr. at 34 and 35).
The older child, Ben, is verbal and when he is under stress he is
angry

and

outspoken.

The

younger

child,

Nathan,

is more

introspective and comes back from visitation bed wetting with
additional aggressive behavior. (Tr. at 35 and 51).

The issue of

breaking up the summer visitation is so important to Plaintiff that
3

she is willing to pay for the transportation for a second, short
summer visit. (Tr. at 35) . Plaintiff testified that she is fearful
for both the children's physical and psychological well-being on
long visitation with the defendant. (Tr at 53).
On the issue of the reasonableness

of the daycare

expense, Plaintiff testified that while the parties were married
they had in-home daycare.
that before she had

(Tr. at 28).

Plaintiff also testified

in-home daycare in California, her work

schedule necessitated that she drop the children off before school
for daycare so that the children had supervision before school
began each morning. (Tr. at 50). Currently, Plaintiff's daycare
expense is $1,017.50 per month: $752.50 for a full time in-home
provider, or nanny, and approximately $265 for the youngest child's
Montessori preschool. (Tr. at 39).
that

the

in-home

daycare

provider

Plaintiff further testified
she

currently

employs

in

California arrives at the home between 7:30 and 8:30 in the morning
and gets the boys ready for school, feeds them breakfast, and gets
them off to school.

The nanny then picks up the children from

school at the two different times they are out and cares for them
until Plaintiff gets home from work.

The youngest child gets out

of school at 12:00 p.m. and the eldest child finishes school at
2:20 p.m. (Tr. at 44).

If Plaintiff is later than usual in the

evening the nanny feeds the children dinner.

(Tr. at 38) .

The

nanny transports the children to their numerous after school
activities, does their laundry and cleans up after them.
38).

(Tr. at

The nanny does not do any laundry for other members of the
4

household, nor does she do general housekeeping.

(Tr. at 45 and

46) .
No

evidence

was

presented

that

the

children's

grandmother, Mr. Fithian's mother, utilized, nor required any
services of the in-home daycare provider.

(Tr. at 40) . Plaintiff

also testified that it was not appropriate for the elder Mrs.
Fithian, at 83 years of age, to be enlisted to perform child care
services.

(Tr. at 43).
Both parties testified that there had been problems in

the past with daycare receipts and accounting in terms of what
would satisfy defendant's need for verification of plaintiff's
child care expenses.

Ultimately, the parties had to go back to

court to obtain assistance from the Court Commissioner as to what
constituted appropriate verification.

(Tr. at 9, 10 and 41).

Plaintiff agreed to keep Defendant informed should the cost of her
daycare increase or decrease, but testified that it would be much
easier if Defendant were ordered to pay a set amount each month,
than having to submit verification of daycare expenses to Defendant
on a monthly basis and potentially have the same types of problems
arise as the parties had before.

(Tr. at 42).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
In order to prevail on appeal, Defendant must establish
that the Trial Court's Order regarding extended summer visitation
is a ruling so outrageous as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
Defendant raises a number of bases for his objection to the Court's
5

ruling; however, the Court's detailed Findings, well supported by
the evidence clearly establish that Judge Stirba's ruling is in the
children's best interests and should be upheld,
POINT II
Defendant also objects to the Court's ruling that he is
responsible for one-half of his children's daycare and preschool
expense•
exercise

Again, this is an issue wherein the Trial Court may
considerable discretion•

A review of the detailed

findings establish the reasonableness of the daycare and preschool
costs and the statute dictates that Defendant is responsible for
one-half that cost, so long as it is actually incurred.
POINT III
Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs
incurred in defending this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§30-3-3 (1953, as amended).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN THE AWARD OF EXTENDED SUMMER VISITATION.
Broad discretion is given to the Trial Court in matters
of child custody and visitation and only when the Court's action is
flagrantly unjust that it rises to the level of abuse of discretion
should this court overrule it.

(See Nilson v. Nilson, 652 P.2d

1323 (Utah 1982), Bake v. Bake, 772 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1989),
Mauqhan v. Mauqhan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989).
Furthermore, the overriding consideration in all issues
of child custody and visitation is the child's best interest.
6

Walker v. Walker, 707 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985), Hoaae v. Hoqqe, 649
P.2d 751 (Utah 1982).

This principle has been codified in Utah

Code

(1953, as

Ann.

§30-3-5(4)

amended)

which

states, "In

determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
relatives, the Court shall consider the welfare of the child."
Nonetheless, Defendant seems to take the approach that mathematical
precision and the annual number of days of visitation he is
entitled

to

exercise

are

more

appropriate

considerations.

Defendant's argument is that he should be awarded the same number
of days of visitation with his children as in the original Decree
of Divorce, regardless of how this affects his children's best
interests.

Defendant's position fails to acknowledge the primary

importance of the children's best interests in determining an
appropriate visitation schedule.
Defendant objects to Plaintiff's testimony at trial
regarding Defendant's behavior during the marriage. (Tr. at 32, 33
and 54).

However, this evidence was not objected to at trial and

cannot be objected to for the first time on appeal.
Another basis for Defendant's dissatisfaction with the
Trial Court's visitation ruling is because it is not in conformity
with the "Standard Visitation Schedule." The "Standard Visitation
Schedule" referred to and relied on in Defendant's brief is not
law; it is not derived from either statute or case law.

It is a

schedule defined by the Third District Court Commissioners to
assist the Court and parties in outlining a visitation schedule.
Defendant has not and cannot present legal authority to support his
7

position

that what he refers to as

"Standardized

Visitation

Schedule" should have any bearing on this case whatsoever.
Defendant

also

refers

to

the

Court

Commissioner's

Recommendation at Pre-Trial as a relevant factor this Court should
consider.

Pursuant to the Utah Code of Judicial Administration,

Section 4-903, the recommendation of the Commissioner at Pre-Trial
is not binding and only a recommendation.
reference to the Recommendation

Therefore, Defendant's

of the Commissioner

and his

inclusion of the Minute Entry as addendum "B" in his brief should
be given little or no weight in the court's review of this appeal.
Furthermore, Judge Stirba had the benefit of considering, not only
Commissioner Arnett's recommendation, but also the evidence and
testimony from the parties themselves in making her Order and
Findings of Fact.
Defendant's brief cites a case from Iowa, wherein a
father was awarded an unspecified length of extended visitation
with a six year old child in Greece.

Defendant argues that if a

six year old child can travel to Greece, than he should be awarded
longer extended visitation with his children, ages 5 and 7, who
reside in a neighboring state.
This argument highlights the importance of upholding the
discretion

of

determinations.

the

Court

in

making

custody

and

visitation

Every child, every custodial parent and every

visiting parent and their individual situations are different.
Accordingly, there can be no set rule as to what visitation

8

schedule is appropriate for every 5 and 7 year old child having
visitation with their father who lives in another state.
The Trial Court is in the best position to make this
determination.

The

cases

cited

above

outlining

the

broad

discretion of the Trial Court recognize this. In the instant case,
the Court appropriately took into consideration the amount of
extended

visitation

Defendant

had previously

spent with the

children, the ability of Defendant to personally spend extended
visitation with the children, Defendant's stability in his current
marriage and the ages and maturity of the children.

These

considerations are appropriately reflected in the court's detailed
Findings of Fact.
by

the

Court

in

All these factors and criteria were considered
light

of

the

children's

best

interests.

Accordingly, the Court did not abuse its discretion in establishing
a summer visitation schedule and its decision should be affirmed.
In addition, Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence
in support of the findings in order to attempt to demonstrate that
those findings are clearly erroneous. This Court wrote in Saunders
v. Sharp, 806 P. 2d 198, 199 (1991) that, "If the appellant fails to
marshall the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record
supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review
of the accuracy of the lower court's Conclusions of Law and the
application of that law in the case."

9

POINT II
THE CHILD CARE EXPENSE AWARD IS REASONABLE AND APPROPRIATE AND
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
OR THAT THE AWARD WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Defendant admits in his brief that there is no standard
of review defined in Utah Case law for appellate review of a child
care award, but concedes that the trial court's decision should be
given great discretion and overruled only if its ruling is found to
be clearly erroneous.

(Appellant's brief at p. 18). A review of

the court's Findings of Fact indicate that the Trial Court's
decision is reasonable and well supported by the evidence.
The Court made detailed Findings on the reasonableness of
the child care costs.

Those Findings of Fact indicate that the

Court took the following factors into consideration:
That $752.50 per month is a reasonable amount of
expense to pay on a monthly basis for in-home child
care, especially in light of the duties that were
testified to in Court, namely, getting the children
ready for school; getting them breakfast; taking
the children to school; bringing the children home
from school; providing lunch for the child that
comes home midday; taking the children to these
various activities; and, attending to their
laundry. The Court is aware of what laundry the
children could generate, and household disarray
that they could create, taking care of the home
insofar as it relates to the child care. There is
not credible evidence otherwise in this Court's
view that the daycare expense was in part
attributable to other household duties. All the
evidence presented to the Court really indicates
that the child care provider is, in fact, providing
child care and not providing other household
duties. Therefore, the Court finds that the child
care expense of $752.50 per month is reasonable and
also necessary to provide child care.
Findings at p. 11.

10

The Court further found "with regard to someone being in
the home at times when that child is not at home, the Court finds
that there is not anything unusual about that particular practice
here, given that fact that person has to be on call in case a child
is sick or that provides an opportunity of time in which to take
care of other child-related issues at home.

The Court does not

think that is unreasonable under the circumstances." (Findings at
p. 12).
As evidenced by the above Findings, the Court took into
consideration all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
daycare issue including Defendant's concern that there would be
times when the daycare provider was in the home and the children
were not. The Court's detailed Findings support her decision that
$752.50 per month for in-home daycare is reasonable.
Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-45-7.7 (2) (c) , 78-45-7.8(5)
and 78-45-7.9(6) (1953, as amended) all indicate that the workrelated child care expense shall be allocated equally to each
parent. As admitted by the Defendant, there is no formula or ratio
for the division of child care expenses as they relate to each
parent's income; child care costs are simply split between the
parties

equally,

regardless

of

income.

The

issue

of

any

consideration of Defendant's second income in arriving at his share
or percentage of responsibility for daycare expenses is irrelevant
and totally unsupported by the Uniform Civil Liability for Support
Act, Utah Code Ann. 78-45-1 et. seq., (1953, as amended).

11

In response to Defendant's objection to paying a set
amount

towards

daycare

each month, the

Court's

decision

to

structure the child care award in this manner is supported by its
Finding that Plaintiff has had great difficulty in collecting the
work-related daycare expenses.

(Findings at p. 13) . In addition,

there was testimony by both parties that there had been numerous
accounting problems with daycare expenses in the past.
41).

(Tr. p. 9,

In addition, there was no dispute that Plaintiff is actually

incurring the daycare and Montessori expenses testified to in court
of

$1,017.15 per month.

Defendant

pay

daycare

Therefore, the Court's order that

of

a

set

amount

each

month,

until

circumstances change is well supported by the testimony presented,
appropriately

documented

in

its

Findings

of

Fact

and

not

unreasonable and certainly not an abuse of discretion or clearly
erroneous. Defendant continues to be afforded statutory protection
under Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.16 (1953, as amended) that provides,
"If an actual expense included in an amount specified in the order
ceases to be incurred, the obligor may suspend making monthly
payments of that expense while it is not being incurred without
obtaining a modification of the child support order."
Defendant further objects to the Court's order that no
ruling was made at this juncture regarding the reasonableness of
the youngest child's attendance at Montessori first grade. At the
time of trial this child was attending Montessori pre-school with
a reasonable monthly expense of $265 per month.

The Court made a

Finding that if this child should attend Montessori first grade,
12

then Defendant's obligation to pay for 1/2 the cost may be brought
by Order to Show Cause. In fact, contrary to Defendant's portrayal
of this as shifting the burden to him to show the child should
continue to attend Montessori, the Court specifically found that if
the

Plaintiff

decides

to

continue Montessori

Plaintiff must

"present justification at that time if she feels it appropriate for
him to continue to go to a Montessori program and require Defendant
to pay one-half of the costs thereof".

(Findings at p. 10).

It would be inappropriate for the Court to make a finding
one way or the other regarding the reasonableness of the child's
attendance at Montessori in the future.

The Court's finding that

any further dispute regarding Montessori may be brought via Order
to Show Cause was an attempt on her part to expedite any hearing on
the matter.
Defendant's Objection to the Findings of Fact fails to
state any specific disputed language or provision.

The Findings

were properly reviewed and entered by the judge and should be
upheld by this Court.
POINT III
DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
INCURRED BY HER IN THE DEFENSE OF THIS APPEAL.
Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) is the
statutory basis for an award of attorney's fees in a divorce
action. It states that: "The Court may order either party to pay to
the clerk a sum or money . . . to enable such party to prosecute or
defend the action." Id.

13

This section has been interpreted to apply to attorney's
fees incurred both at the trial and appellate levels. See Dahlberg
v. Dahlberq. 77 Utah 157, 292 P. 214 (1930), Carter v. Carter. 584
P.2d 904 (Utah 1978), and Mauahan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 162, (Utah
App. 1989).
Clearly, this statute gives the Court the authority to
award Plaintiff her attorney's fees to allow her to defend this
appeal.
Plaintiff

prevailed

at the

trial

level

and

should

Defendant's appeal uphold the Trial Court's decision, she is
certainly entitled to a reimbursement from Defendant for the legal
fees and expenses she has incurred in defending this action before
this Court.

Furthermore, Defendant is an attorney licensed to

practice law in the State of Utah and it is believed that he is
doing

much,

(if not

all)

of

the work

on

his

own appeal.

Accordingly, defendant's costs in pursuing this appeal may be much
less (or none at all), than the costs Plaintiff has been forced to
incur to defend this action.
The Court should award Plaintiff all of her attorney's
fees and costs related to defending this appeal and the matter
should be remanded to the Trial Court for a determination of the
amount of the fees and for entry of an appropriate judgment against
Defendant.
CONCLUSION
Defendant has chosen to appeal the Trial Court's decision
in two highly discretionary areas: visitation and day care costs.
14

Defendant alleges that the Court's order of extended summer
visitation constitutes an abuse of discretion and that the Court's
Finding that Plaintiff's actually

incurred daycare costs are

reasonable is clearly erroneous.

The Trial Court should be

afforded great discretion in both areas and the Judge's decision
tampered with, only, if her decision is deemed clearly unjust. In
this case, the Court heard both party's testify, made detailed
Findings, well supported by the evidence and, its decision should
be upheld in all respects.

Plaintiff should be awarded all her

attorney's fees and costs for having to defend this matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^Q

day of January, 1993.

DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN

SftSRONATDONOVAN
SHANNON W. CLARK
Attorneys for Lisa Hartwig, Plaintiff/
Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

Q,C> day of January, 1993, two

true and correct copies of the above and foregoing Appellee's Reply
Brief were duly hand delivered, addressed to:
Kathryn S. Denholm, Esq.
263 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84115

IQAJUiARON A. DONOVAN, ESQ.
SHANNON W. CLARK, ESQ.
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Salt Lake County Utah

JUN 2 9 1992
SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383

/

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oOo
LISA FITHIAN (HARTWIG)
ORDER MODIFYING
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
v,

Civil No. 894900194
DAVID HARTWIG,
Judge Anne M. Stirba
Defendant,
-oOo
Both parties1 Petitions for Modification of Decree of Divorce
came on regularly for trial on April 2, 1992, before the Honorable
Anne M, Stirba, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court,
Plaintiff appearing in person and by and through her attorney,
Sharon A. Donovan, and Defendant appearing in person and by and
through his attorney, Kathryn S. Denholm, and the Court having
heard testimony of Plaintiff and Defendant and having received
documentary evidence, and counsel for the parties having met in
chambers

and

having

resolved

certain

visitation

issues and

submitted the issue of summer visitation and amount of day care to
the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, and
the Court having made and entered its written Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law herein,

A-l

0234

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

The Defendant's visitation shall be modified as follows:
A.

Alternate school breaks, not to exceed a one-

month block.
B.

One-half of the Christmas break, with Christmas

Day to be included in Defendant's visitation period in
odd-numbered years beginning in 1993, with the further
provision that the children not be required to travel on
Christmas Eve or Christmas Day,
C.

In the summer of 1992, Defendant shall have

both of the children for two two-week blocks. Plaintiff
shall pay for the round-trip ticket for the second block
of time for the children, in addition to one-half of two
other visits throughout the year, as stated in paragraph
1(G) below.
Defendant shall notify Plaintiff by May 15, 1992,
and thereafter by May 1st of each year of the times
requires for summer visitation.
D.

Commencing in 1993, Defendant shall have summer

visitation

for

two

three-week

periods,

and

this

visitation should continue until each child reaches the
age of nine.

As each child turns the age of nine, the

visitation shall increase to six weeks, with two blocks

2

A-?

of time and with no block of time being longer than one
month•
E.

One long weekend not to exceed six days only

during the time the children would not be in school, upon
reasonable

notice.

Defendant

shall

pay

for

the

transportation costs for the visit.
F.

Reasonable weekly telephone visitation with the

parties children on Sunday evenings at 8:00, Salt Lake
City time, provided that Defendant pay the costs thereof.
G.

Reasonable visitation in the home state of the

children, upon fourteen days notice, as long as the
visitation does not interfere with previously scheduled
activities, i.e., Defendant to transport the children to
and from any previously planned activities.
H.

The parties shall split the transportation

costs for Christmas and shall obtain the best fare
possible, with the parties exchanging the information
necessary by the deadline necessary in order to obtain
the cheapest fare.
I.

Defendant

shall drop the children off to

Plaintiff's husband, babysitter or relative.
2.
per month

Defendant should be required to pay an additional $258.75
for

day

care, until the Montessori, education

is

concluded, for a total of $508.75 per month, commencing in April,
1992.

When the child ceases the Montessori experience, then that
3

will be reduced down by one-half of the total tuition of $265.00
per month, to $376.25 per month for day care.
3.

Each party shall pay their own attorneys fees incurred

herein.
DATED this ff^K^ day of

v^y^*—o—,

1992.

BY THE ^OURT:

ANNE M. STIRBA
District Court Judge

__— ^

Approved as to form:

KATHRYN S. DENHOLM
Attorney for Defendant
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Salt Lake County Utah

JUN 2 9 1992
'"'

SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oOo
LISA FITHIAN (HARTWIG),
Plaintiff,
v.

:
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
:
:
:
:
:

DAVID HARTWIG,
Defendant.

Civil No. 894900194
Judge Anne M. Stirba

oOo
Both parties1 Petitions for Modification of Decree of Divorce
came on regularly for trial on April 2, 1992, before the Honorable
Anne M. Stirba, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court,
Plaintiff appearing in person and by and through her attorney,
Sharon A. Donovan, and Defendant appearing in person and by and
through his attorney, Kathryn S. Denholm, and the Court having
heard testimony of Plaintiff and Defendant and having received
documentary evidence, and counsel for the parties having met in
chambers

and

having

resolved

certain

visitation

issues

and

submitted the issue of summer visitation and amount of day care to
the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, does
now make, adopt and find the following:

A-5
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that on or about August 22, 1990, a

Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter, which provided, in
relevant part, as follows:
Custody/Visitation,
Plaintiff was awarded the
permanent care, custody and control of the parties' two
minor children, Benjamin James Hartwig, age 5, born on
October 17, 1984, and Nathan Meade Hartwig, age 3, born
on January 19, 1987, subject to specified rights of
visitation on behalf of Defendant as follows:
A.
Alternate weekends, from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to
Sunday at 6:00 p.m.
B.
Alternate holidays, with
the
following
holidays: New Years Day; Martin Luther King Jr. Day;
President's Day; Easter; Memorial Day; Independence Day;
Pioneer Day; Labor Day; Columbus Day; Halloween;
Veterans1 Day; and Thanksgiving Day.
C.
One evening on the off week from 5:30 p.m. to
8:30 p.m.
D.
Christmas Day from 6:00 p.m. through December
26th at 8:00 p.m.
E.
Prior to the children entering school, two oneweek blocks in the summer, with notification by June 15th
for 1990 and thereafter by May 1st of each year. Once
the children reach the age of nine, Defendant shall be
entitl€*d to have the children for six weeks in the
summer, not to exceed four weeks for one visitation
block.
FUpon the children entering school, one-half of
the Christmas break and one month in the summer for two
two-we€ik periods of time. In the event that the children
are in year-round school, Defendant shall be entitled to
one-half of all breaks, with no block to exceed two weeks
at a time and not to exceed one month total on an annual
basis prior to the children reaching nine years of age,
or to exceed six weeks total on an annual basis after the
children reach the age of nine, not to exceed four weeks
for one visitation block.
2
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G.
Each Father1s Dayf regardless of whose weekend
upon which this holiday may fall.
H.
Each Mother's Day will be with the Plaintiff,
regardless whose weekend upon which this holiday may
fall.
I.
The afternoon and evening of each child's
birthday, or one day in the same week as that child's
birthday as determined by the child.
J.
If Defendant works every weekend as his primary
job and primary source of income, he shall be entitled to
one overnight visitation per week on a consistent night
to be agreed between the parties.
At such time as
Defendant no longer works every weekend as his primary
job and primary source of income, the other visitation
provisions provided herein, i.e., alternate weekends, one
evening on the off week, etc., should be implemented.
K.
The parties shall have equal access to medical,
school records and other important records for the
children. Plaintiff shall sign any releases that are
necessary to allow the children's school to provide
Defendant with a schedule of all the upcoming school
activities.
In the event any significant school or
social events occur that are not on the schedule,
Plaintiff shall provide Defendant reasonable notice in
advance of those activities. Defendant shall be notified
of non-routine medical treatment and shall have access to
the children's medical files.
L.
Each party shall keep the other advised of
their current address and telephone numbers, as well as
that same information concerning the children's regular
care givers. Neither party shall move their residence
outside Salt Lake County without thirty (30) days prior
written notice to the other party.
Child Support. Defendant was ordered to pay a base
amount of child support in the amount of $140.50 per
month, per child, for a total of $281.00 per month. In
addition, Defendant was ordered to pay up to $250.00 per
month for his one-half portion of the reasonable workrelated day care, and there was a cap of $250.00 for the
day care expenses, for a total monthly support of
$531.00, after giving Defendant a credit for medical
insurance premiums of $50.00 per month for the children.
Said support was to be paid through the Clerk of the
3
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Court, one-half on the 5th and 20th days of each month,
until the children reach the age of eighteen and graduate
from high school in their expected senior year.
2.

Since

the

entry

of

the

Decree

of

Divorce,

the

circumstances of the parties have materially and substantially
changed, including, but not limited to the following:
A.

Plaintiff has remarried and at the end of

August, 1991, moved to the State of California with her
new husband and the children, where her new husband is
starting Theology School. Plaintiff's employment in the
State of Utah was also in the process of being phased
out.
B.

After the move to California, Plaintiff was

unemployed for a period of time and is now employed,
earnincf a gross income of $4,166.00 per month, which is
less than what she was earning at the time of the entry
of the Decree of Divorce of $4,468.00 gross per month.
C.

The day care expenses for the children have

substantially increased and have gone from approximately
$600.00 per month to $1,017.15, which includes Montessori
preschool and day care expenses.

The overall cost of

living is also higher in California, with Plaintiff's
mortgage payment being $1,200.00 per month for a very
modest home.
D.

Defendant has remarried and his income has

increased since the entry of the Decree of Divorce. At
4
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the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, his
income was $1,988.00.

His present income is $2,370.00

per month, and pursuant to Defendants testimony, he also
earned approximately $5,000.00 in 1991 from his private
law practice, after business expenses.
3.

The Court finds that the parties have had ongoing

problems with visitation, but the parties have stipulated to the
following visitation:
A.

Alternate school breaks, not to exceed a one-

month block.
B.

One-half of the Christmas break, with Christmas

Day to be included in Defendant's visitation period in
odd-numbered years beginning in 1993, with the further
provision that the children not be required to travel on
Christmas Eve or Christmas Day.
C.

In the summer of 1992, Defendant should have

both of the children for two two-week blocks. Plaintiff
should pay for the round-trip ticket for the second block
of time for the children, in addition to one-half of two
other visits throughout the year, as stated in paragraph
3(G) below.
Defendant should notify Plaintiff by May 15, 1992,
and thereafter by May 1st of each year of „the times
requires for summer visitation.

5
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D.

One long weekend not to exceed six days only

during the time the children would not be in school, upon
reasonable notice.

Defendant should be ordered to pay

for the transportation costs for the visit.
E.

Reasonable weekly telephone visitation with the

parties children on Sunday evenings at 8:00, Salt Lake
City time, provided that Defendant pay the costs thereof.
F.

Reasonable visitation in the home state of the

children, upon fourteen days notice, as long as the
visitation does not interfere with previously scheduled
activities, i.e., Defendant to transport the children to
and from any previously planned activities.
G.

The parties should split the transportation

costs for Christmas and shall obtain the best fare
possible, with the parties exchanging the information
necessary by the deadline necessary in order to obtain
the cheapest fare.
H,

Defendant should drop the children off to

Plaintiff's husband, babysitter or relative.
4.

The Court further finds, with regard to the summer

visitation issue, that the non-custodial parent is entitled to
reasonable visitation, and the Court views visitation issues in
light of what is in the best interests of the children and in light
of the non-custodial spouse's parents' entitlement to reasonable
visitation. The Court finds that the parties have agreed that for
6
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1992, there may be two two-week periods for both of these children
and that it seems to be in the best interests of the children and
reasonable in light of the stipulation of the parties.
With

regard

to subsequent years, the

Court

finds that

visitation must be set in recognition of the rights of the natural
parents and what is in the best interests of the children.

In

making such orders, the Court considers the age of the children,
the relationship of the children to the non-custodial parent, the
stability of the home environment of the non-custodial parent and
other issues that pertain to what is in the best interests of the
children regarding visitation.

In the Court's view, age is a

significant factor, and the ages of the children, Nathan having
just turned five in January, 1992, and Ben being seven years old at
this time.
The Court finds that it is reasonable to change visitation
during

the

summer

months

gradually,

rather

than

making

a

significant change from two two-week periods to all of a sudden a
volume of a six week period of time, from the four-week period of
block of time, or even as Defendant has requested, even six weeks
at a time. After hearing all of the testimony in this matter, the
Court does not believe that it is in the best interests of these
children, given their ages and given the fact that they have not
had the opportunity to have visitation with their father for more
than one week to ten days at a time to date.

7
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Defendant testified that one of the reasons he wanted a larger
block of time for visitation was due to his work schedule, and he
also felt that it would benefit the children to be able to spend a
larger block of time with him and that he would attempt to arrange
his work schedule.

The Court finds, however, that if because of

his work schedule there were other problems and he were not able to
fulfill the four-week arrangement, that he would then return the
children to the natural mother. The Court has some concerns about
that arrangement in and of itself, because even if Defendant would
be able to make those kinds of changes, once the children have it
in their minds and expectation of a certain period, then obviously
the Court finds it is in the best interests to fulfill that
expectation so long as there aren't other problems that would
outweigh that in any particular circumstance.
Defendant has proposed larger blocks of time because he wants
to be able to do things with the children, such as take off work
and do things with them and he felt that longer blocks of time
would be valuable in and of themselves.
that issue, as well.

The Court has considered

The Court has also heard evidence from the

Plaintiff concerning Defendant's marital situation and the problems
he experienced in the marriage and arguments that have ensued
between Defendant and his current wife in front of the children in
the summer of 1992. This was not disputed by Defendant.
In light of the ages of the children and their best interests,
the Court specifically finds that after 1992, the summer visitation
8
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should occur in a gradual fashion and increase in length of time,
until they reach the age of nine. The Court finds that Plaintiff fs
proposal is reasonable in this matter, and the Court finds that
there should be two three-week periods in 1993, and that visitation
should continue until each child reaches the age of nine.

The

Court finds that as each child turns the age of nine, the
visitation should increase to six weeks, with two blocks of time
and with no block of time being longer than one month.

The Court

specifically recommends that there will be a period of time when
the older child will be staying longer and the younger child would
come home.

The Court finds, however, that a nine year old can

better handle a longer period of visitation than a seven year old
could under the same circumstances.

The Court finds that it is

important for the parties to encourage communication with the
children.
5.

With regard

to the day care

issue, the Court has

considered the testimony that has been presented and arguments of
counsel with regard to this particular issue. The Court finds that
Defendant has been paying $250.00 per month, which is less than
one-half of the actual day care costs incurred by Plaintiff when
she resided in Utah.

That was the amount that the parties agreed

to at the time of the divorce.

Plaintifffs day care expenses now

amount to $1,017.15 per month, with $265.00 going towards payment
of the Montessori Preschool/day care tuition. The Court believes
that is a reasonable amount for Montessori tuition.
9
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The Court is

aware that when Nathan enters kindergarten that the Montessori
school

amount

should

disappear

because

when

he

goes

to

kindergarten, presumably at a public school, that tuition amount
will no longer apply.

It is not clear, based upon the testimony,

as to when Nathan will go to kindergarten, but when he does, that
expense should no longer exist.
The Court finds that if the preschool expense for Montessori
continues after Nathan enters kindergarten, that issue should be
reserved by this Court, with Plaintiff to present justification at
that time if she feels it appropriate for him to continue to go to
a Montessori program and require Defendant to pay one-half of the
costs thereof, which may be done by way of Order to Show Cause.
With regard to the other child care expense, that amount is
$752.50 according to Plaintiff's testimony.

First of all, with

regard to Plaintiff's mother-in-law who resides with the parties in
California, the Court is not persuaded that expenses of child care
represented

in

Plaintiff's

figures

covers

Plaintiff's mother-in-law, who is elderly

any

expenses

for

(age 83), but self-

sufficient. There is no credible evidence otherwise, and the Court
finds that that amount does not pertain to the care, and whatever
care is attributable in the family, not to the mother-in-law.
Second of all, with regard to whether the mother-in-law could
step up and be a child care provider, the Court finds that the
custodial parent has to have discretion in determining who is to
care for the children. Obviously, part or some of the functions of
10

this child care provider goes to things that the mother-in-law is
not able to provide, specifically, transporting the children to and
from Spanish lessons, karate lessons, baseball games, try-out
practices and that sort of thing, and there may be others.

Some

discussion has to be given to the child care so that it is apparent
who is best able to provide appropriate chid care.

In this

particular circumstance, the Court is satisfied that there has not
been an unreasonable decision in not choosing the mother-in-law to
care for the children, but that that person could look to outside
care.
The Court finds that $752.50 per month is a reasonable amount
of expense to pay on a monthly basis for in-home child care,
especially in light of the duties that were testified to in Court,
namely, getting the children ready

for school; getting them

breakfast; taking the children to school; bringing the children
home from school; providing lunch for the child that comes home
midday; taking the children to these various activities; and
attending to their laundry. The Court is aware of what laundry the
children could generate, and household disarray that they could
create, taking care of the home insofar as it relates to the child
care. There is no credible evidence otherwise in this Court's view
that the day care expense was in part attributable to other
household duties. All of the evidence that has been presented to
the Court really indicates that the child care provider is, in
fact, providing child care and not providing other household
11
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duties. Therefore, The Court finds that the child care expense of
$752.50 per month is reasonable and also necessary to provide child
care.

The Court finds that that covers everything with regard to

the child care expense.
Accordingly, the testimony of Defendant was that it would be
difficult for him to come up with the extra money, but the Court is
satisfied that there is an ability to pay, to contribute the
additional amounts towards child care expense.

The Court finds

that $1,117.50 is a reasonable amount of total monthly child care
under the circumstances and for the reasons indicated previously,
and

therefore,

until

the Montessori

education

is

concluded,

Defendant should be required to pay an additional $258.75 per
month, for a total of $508.75 per month, which is half of that
amount for day care, to commence with the month of April, 1992.
When the child ceases the Montessori experience, then that will be
reduced down by one-half of the total tuition of $265.00, or a
reduction to $376.25 per month for day care.
With regard to someone being in the home at times when the
child is not at home, the Court finds that there is not anything
unusual about that particular practice here, given the fact that
that person has to be on call in case a child is sick or that
provides an opportunity of time in which to take care of other
child-related issues at home.

The Court does not,, think that is

unreasonable under the circumstances.

This again may change when

the children are in school full-time.

The Court finds that there

12
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will have to be a re-evaluation of this at that time because
presumably the child care expense would be substantially affected
by having two children in school full-time-

There is no evidence

before the Court on which to rule on that particular issue now.
6.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has had great difficulty

in collecting the work-related day care expenses.
7.

The Court further finds that the parties have agreed that

they should each pay their own attorney's fees incurred herein.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
adopts its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Defendant's visitation shall be modified as follows:
A.

Alternate school breaks, not to exceed a one-

month block.
B.

One-half of the Christmas break, with Christmas

Day to be included in Defendant's visitation period in
odd-numbered years beginning in 1993, with the further
provision that the children not be required to travel on
Christmas Eve or Christmas Day.
C.

In the summer of 1992, Defendant shall have

both of the children for two two-week blocks. Plaintiff
shall pay for the round-trip ticket for the second block
of time for the children, in addition to one-half of two
other visits throughout the year, as stated in paragraph
1(G) below.
13

Defendant shall notify Plaintiff by May 15, 1992,
and thereafter by May 1st of each year of the times
requires for summer visitation.
D.

Commencing in 1993, Defendant shall have summer

visitation

for

two

three-week

periods,

and

this

visitation should continue until each child reaches the
age of nine.

As each child turns the age of nine, the

visitation shall increase to six weeks, with two blocks
of time and with no block of time being longer than one
month.
E.

One long weekend not to exceed six days only

during the time the children would not be in school, upon
reasonable

notice.

Defendant

shall

pay

for

the

transportation costs for the visit.
F.

Reasonable weekly telephone visitation with the

parties children on Sunday evenings at 8:00, Salt Lake
City time, provided that Defendant pay the costs thereof.
G.

Reasonable visitation in the home state of the

children, upon fourteen days notice, as long as the
visitation does not interfere with previously scheduled
activities, i.e., Defendant to transport the children to
and from any previously planned activities.
H.

The parties shall split the transportation

costs for Christmas and shall obtain the best fare
possible, with the parties exchanging the information
14
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necessary by the deadline necessary in order to obtain
the cheapest fare.
I.

Defendant shall drop the children off to

Plaintiff's husband, babysitter or relative.
2.
per month

Defendant should be required to pay an additional $258.75
for

day

care, until

the Montessori

education

is

concluded, for a total of $508.75 per month, commencing in April,
1992.

When the child ceases the Montessori experience, then that

will be reduced down by one-half of the total tuition of $265.00
per month, to $376.25 per month for day care.
3.

Each party shall pay their own attorney's fees incurred

herein.
DATED this

day of

V^^Ows-Q

, 1992.

BY THE COURT:

ANNE M. STIRBA
District Couct—CQidge

Approved as to form:

KATHRYN S. DENHOLM
Attorney for Defendant

15
r) •-> rt

A-19

023

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

of Mayf 1992, a true

and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Kathryn Schuler Denholm
Attorney at Law
263 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
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(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage;
(i) incurable insanity; or
(j) when the husband and wife have lived separately under a decree of separate maintenance of
any state for three consecutive years without cohabitation.
4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection
3'<j) does not affect the liability of either party under
any provision for separate maintenance previously
granted.
•5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the
grounds of insanity unless: (i) the defendant has
been adjudged insane by the appropriate authorities of this or another state prior to the commencement of the action; and (ii) the court finds
by the testimony of competent witnesses that the
insanity of the defendant is incurable.
(b) The court shall appoint for the defendant a
guardian ad litem, who shall protect the interests
of the defendant. A copy of the summons and
complaint shall be served on the defendant in
person or by publication, as provided by the laws
of this state in other actions for divorce, or upon
his guardian ad litem, and upon the county attorney for the county where the action is prosecuted.
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the
merits of the case and if the defendant resides out
of this state, take depositions as necessary, attend the proceedings, and make a defense as is
just to protect the rights of the defendant and the
interests of the state.
(d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction over the payment of alimony, the distribution of property, and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as the courts and
judges possess in other actions for divorce.
(e) The plaintiff or defendant may. if the defendant resides in this state, upon notice, have
the defendant brought into the court at trial, or
have an examination of the defendant by two or
more competent physicians, to determine the
mental condition of the defendant. For this purpose either party may have leave from the court
to enter any asylum or institution where the defendant may be confined. The costs of court in
this action shall be apportioned by the court. 1987
30-3-2. Right of h u s b a n d t o divorce.
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from
his wife for the same causes and in the same manner
as the wife mav obtain a divorce from her husband.
1953

30-3-3. T e m p o r a r y alimony a n d suit money.
The court may order either party to pay to the clerk
a sum of money for the separate support and maintenance of the adverse party and the children, and to
enable such partv to prosecute or defend the action.
1953

30-3-4.

P l e a d i n g s — F i n d i n g s - Decree - - Sealing.
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and
signed by the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney.
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted
upon default or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in the cause.
(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a
child or children and the plaintiff has filed an
action in t h e judicial district as defined in Section 78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be
administered, a decree of divorce may not be
granted until both parties have attended, a man-

datory course provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and
have presented a certificate of course completion
to the court. The court may waive this requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one
of the parties, if it determines course attendance
and completion are not necessary, appropriate,
feasible, or in the best interest of the parties.
(d» All hearings and trials for divorce shall be
held before the court or the court commissioner
as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner
in all divorce cases shall make and file findings
and decree upon the evidence.
{2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be
sealed by order of the court upon the motion of either
party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned
parties, the attorneys of record or attorney filing a
notice of appearance in the action, the Office of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied for or is receiving public assistance, or the court
have full access to the entire record. This sealing does
not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend
the decree.
1992
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4 4.
30-3-5.

Repealed.

1990

Disposition of p r o p e r t y — M a i n t e n a n c e
a n d h e a l t h c a r e of p a r t i e s a n d children
— Division of d e b t s — Court to have
c o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n — Custody a n d
visitation — T e r m i n a t i o n of alimony —
N o n m e r i t o r i o u s petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court
may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The
court shall include the following in every decree of
divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the
payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
and
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify
respective creditors or obligees, regarding
the court's division of debts, obligations, or
liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of
these orders.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining
child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial
parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that th« dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by
the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and

30-3-5.1

HUSBAND

maintenance of the parties, n • ;-t.niv „» \\t . \
dren and their support, maintenance, health, ai-d
dental care, or the distribution of the property aiid
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessarv
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents
grandparents, and other relatives the c*»urt --• ' !
consider the welfare of the child
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically prowdVs
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However,
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party
paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(6) A n y order of the court that a party pay alimony
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is
residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if
it is further established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a court order is made
and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines
that the petition was without merit and not asserted
in good faith.
1991
30-3-5 1

Pi c> vision for income v<: • :- I-.-JJ.. • .
child support o r d e r .
Whenever a court enters an order for child suppM i.
it shall include in the order a provision for withholding income as a means of collecting child support as
provided in Title 78, Chapter 45d.
1985
30-3-5.2. A l l e g a t i o n s of child a b u s e or child sex
ual a b u s e — Investigation.
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request
for modification of a divorce decree, an allegation of
child abuse or child sexual abuse is made, implicating
either party, the court shall order that an. investigation be conducted by the Division of Family Services
within the Department of Human Services in accordance with Title 62A. Chapter 4, Part 5. A final
award of custody or visitation may not be rendered
until a report on that investigation is received by the
court. That investigation shall be conducted by the
Division of Family Services within 30 days of the
court's notice and request for an investigation. In reviewing this report, the court shall comply with Section 78-7-9.
I***"
30-3-5.5.

i v m i o n to protect abused child
-hi
risdiction under this chapter.
(1) A person who has filed a complaint under t>,i
chapter may also file a petition with the district couit
for a protective order for the protection of any chil
dren residing with either party to the action under
this chapter. The petition and procedures shall be the
same as for the issuance of protective orders in the
juvenile court under Sections 78-3a-20.5, 78-3a-20.6,
78-3a-20.7, 78-3a-20.8, 78-3a-20.9, and 78-3a-20.10.
The court or the cohabitant may use the protections
provided in this chapter and Title 78, Chapter 3a,
Juvenile Courts, and when necessary, those protections under Title 76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against the
Person, which provide for criminal prosecution.
(2) A person who has obtained, a protective ord*-

,v
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pertaining to the same family member nanv-i
protective oid.-r

jy-

30-3-«*»

w-

Kept-iled.

to-.*t /
n IM ii decree becomes absolut*
1 * The decree of divorce becomes absolute
fa i on the date it is signed by the court ar.
entered by the clerk in the register of actions it
both the parties who have a child or children and
the plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial
district as defined in Section 78-1-2.1 where the
pilot program is administered and have completed attendance at the mandatory course provided in Section 30-3-11.3 except if the court
waives the requirement, on its own motion or on
the motion of one of the parties, upon determination that course attendance and completion are
not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in the
best interest of the parties;
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the
court, may specifically designate, unless an appeal or other proceedings for review are pending;
or
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes
absolute, for sufficient cause otherwise orders.
(2) The court, upon application or on its own motion for good cause shown, may waive, alter, or extend a designated period of time before the decree
becomes absolute, but not to exceed six months from
the signing and entry of the decree.
199-2
30-3-8. Remarriage — When unlawful,
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dissolves their marriage by decree may marry any person other than the spouse from whom the divorce was
granted until it becomes absolute. If an appeal is
taken, the divorce is not absolute until after affirmance of the decree.
isss
30-3-9.

Repealed.

1969

30 3 10. Custody of child* »-n in i-ast- ot s e p a r a tion or d i \ o r o r
< u s t o d \ consideration.
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children
are separated, or their marriage is declared void or
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future
care and custody of the minor children as it considers
appropriate. In determining custody, the court shall
consider the best interests of the child and the past
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each -v
the parties. The court may inquire of the children u
take into consideration the children's desires reg.tr •
:;.\r th** future custody, but the expressed desires a:r.*.i • -ntrolling and the court may determine tht- chr
custody otherwise.
.1 awarding custody, the court shall cor :
o:her factors the court finds relevant, w:x
- * '. is most likely to act in the best interests of th*
including allowing the child frequent and con
Liiiunig contact with the noncustodial parent as tht
court finds appropriate
*^
30-3-10.1. Joint legal custody defined
In this chapter, "joint legal custody":
(1) means the sharing of the rights, privileges,
duties, and powers of a parent by both parents,
where specified;
(2) may include an award of exclusive authority Kv the court, to one parent to make specific
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78-44-39
78-44-39.

Duties under prior law — Property to
be included in initial report.
(1) This chapter does not relieve a holder of a duty
to report, pay, or deliver property arising before July
1, 1983. Such holder who fails to comply before that
date is subject to the applicable enforcement and penalty provisions in existence at that time and those
provisions are continued in effect for the purpose of
this subsection, subject to Subsection 78-44-30(2).
(2) The initial report to be filed under this chapter
for property t h a t was not required to be reported before July 1, 1983, but which is subject to this chapter
shall include all items of property that would have
been presumed abandoned during the ten-year period
prior to July 1, 1983, as if this chapter had been in
effect during that period.
1983
78-44-40^'Application a n d c o n s t r u c t i o n of c h a p ter.
This chapter shall be applied and construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the
law with respect to the subject of this chapter among
states enacting it.
1983
C H A P T E R 45
UNIFORM C I V I L LIABILITY FOR S U P P O R T
ACT
Section
78-45-1.
78-45-2.
78-45-3.
78-45-4.
78-45-4.1.

78-45-4.2.

78-45-4.3.
78-45-5.
78-45-6.
78-45-7.
78-45-7.1.

78-45-7.2.
78-45-7.3.
78-45-7.4.
78-45-7.5.
78-45-7.6.
78-45-7.7.
78-45-7.8.
78-45-7.9.
78-45-7.10.
78-45-7.11.
78-45-7.12.
78-45-7.13.
78-45-7.14.

Short title.
Definitions.
Duty of man.
Duty of woman.
Duty of stepparent to support stepchild — Effect of termination of
marriage or common law relationship.
Natural or adoptive parent has primary obligation of support — Right
of stepparent to recover support.
Ward of state — Primary obligation to
support.
Duty of obligor regardless of presence
or residence of obligee.
District court jurisdiction.
Determination of amount of support
— Rebuttable guidelines.
Medical and dental expenses of dependent children — Assigning responsibility for payment — Insurance coverage.
Application of guidelines — Rebuttal.
Procedure — Documentation — Stipulation.
Obligation — Adjusted gross income
used.
Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
Adjusted gross income.
Calculation of obligations.
Split custody — Obligation calculations.
J o i n t physical custody — Obligation
calculations.
Reduction when child becomes 18.
Reduction for extended visitation.
Income in excess of tables.
Advisory committee — Membership
and functions.
Child support obligation table.

Section
78-45-7.15.
78-45-7.16.
78-45-7.17.
78-45-7.18.
78-45-7.19.
78-45-8.
78-45-9.
78-45-9.1.
78-45-9.2.
78-45-10.
78-45-11.

78-45-12.
78-45-13.
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Medical and dental expenses — Insurance.
Child care expenses — Expenses not
incurred.
Child care costs.
Limitation on amount of support ordered.
Determination of parental liability
Continuing jurisdiction.
Enforcement of right of suppon
Repealed.
County attorney to assist obligee
Appeals.
Husband and wife privileged communication inapplicable — Competency of spouses.
Rights are in addition to those presently existing.
Interpretation and construction.

78-45-1. S h o r t title.
This act may be cited as the Uniform Civil Liabih"
for Support Act.
is-"
78-45-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(D "Adjusted gross income" means income ca.culated under Subsection 78-45-7.6(1).
(2* "Base child support award" means thr
award calculated using the guidelines before additions for uninsured medical expenses ar.:
work-related child care costs.
(3> "Base combined child support obligation table."* "child support table," or "table" means t r r
table in Section 78-45-7.14.
(4* "Child" means a son or daughter younger
than 18 years of age and a son or daughter of ar.;.
age who is incapacitated from earning a l:\.r.g
and is without sufficient means.
(5) "Earnings" means compensation paid :r
payable for personal services, whether denorr..nated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or
otherwise, and specifically includes periodic pay ment pursuant to pension or retirement programs, or insurance policies of any type. Earnings specifically includes all gain derived iror
capital, from labor, or from both combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion
of capital assets.
(6» "Guidelines" means the child suppon.
guidelines in Sections 78-45-7.2 through
78-45-7.18.
(7) "Joint physical custody" means the chile
stays with each parent overnight for more than
25% of the year, and both parents contribute to
the expenses of the child in addition to paying
child support.
(8> "Obligee" means any person to whom ..
duty of support is owed.
(9» "Obligor" means any person owing a dut>
of support.
(10) "Parent" includes a natural parent, an
adoptive parent, or a stepparent.
(11) "Split custody" means that each pareni
has physical custody of at least one of the children.
(12) "State" includes any state, territory, or
possession of the United States, the District of
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto

Rico.

(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential
and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing
earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in
the community.
<c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute
a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative
proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as
to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the
following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for
the parents' minor children approach or
equal the amount of income the custodial
parent can earn,
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he cannot earn minimum
wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills;
or
uv) unusual emotional or physical needs
of a child require the custodial parent's presence in the home
<8» ;a> Gross income may not include the earnings
of a child who is the subject of a child support
award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own
right, such as Supplemental Security Income.
<b» Social Security benefits received by a child
due to the earnings of a parent may be credited
as child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting the amount
against the potential obligation of that parent.
Other unearned income of a child may be considered as income to a parent depending upon the
circumstances of each case.
1990
78-45-7.6. Adjusted gross income.
1) As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross income" is the amount calculated by subtracting from
gross income alimony previously ordered and paid
and child support previously ordered.
•2) The guidelines do not reduce the total child
support award by adjusting the gross incomes of the
parents for alimony ordered in the pending proceeding. In establishing alimony, the court shall consider
that in determining the child support, the guidelines
do not provide a deduction from gross income for alimony
1989
78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations.
'1) The parents' child support obligation shall be
divided between them in proportion to their adjusted
HTOSS incomes.

<2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and
split custody as defined in Section 78-45-2, the total
child support award shall be determined as follows:
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the
parents and determine the base combined child
suppoit obligation using the base child support
obligation table.
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate
share of the base combined child support obligation by multiplying the combined child support
obligation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross income, and subtracting
from the products the children's portion of any

monthly payments made directly by each parent
for medical and dental insurance premiums
(c) Allocate monthly work-related child care
costs equally to each parent.
(d) Calculate the total child support award by
adding the noncustodial parent's share of the
base child support obligation calculated in Subsection (2Kb) and the amount allocated in Subsection (2)(c). Include in the order both amounts
and the total child support award.
(3) The base combined child support obligation table provides combined child support obligations for up
to ten children. For more than ten children, additional amounts shall be added to the base child support obligation shown. The amount shown on the table is the support amount for the total number of
children, not an amount per child.
1990
78-45-7.8.

Split custody — Obligation calculations.
In cases of split custody, the total child support
award shall be determined as follows:
< 1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the
parents and determine the base combined child
support obligation using the base child support
obligation table. Allocate a portion of the calculated amount between the parents in proportion
to the number of children for whom each parent
has physical custody. The amounts so calculated
are a tentative base child support obligation due
each parent from the other parent for support of
the child or children for whom each parent has
physical custody.
(2> Multiply the tentative base child support
obligation due each parent by the percentage
that the other parent's adjusted gross income
bears to the total combined adjusted gross income
of both parents.
*3) Subtract from the products in Subsection
(2/ the children's portion of any monthly payments made directly by each parent for medical
and dental insurance premiums.
(4) Subtract the lesser amount in Subsection
(3) from the larger amount to determine the base
child support award to be paid by the parent with
the greater financial obligation.
(5) Allocate combined monthly work-related
child care costs equally to each parent.
(6) Calculate the total child support award by
adding the base child support award calculated
in Subsection (4) and the amount allocated in
Subsection (5). Include both amounts and the
total child support award in the child^support
order.
^ 1990
78-45-7.9. Joint physical custody — Obligation
calculations.
In cases of joint physical custody, the total child
support award shall be determined as follows:
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the
parents and determine the base combined child
support obligation using the base child support
obligation table.
(2) Calculate each parent's proportionate
share of the base combined child support obligation by multiplying the combined child support
obligation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross income. The amounts so calculated are a tentative base child support obligation due from each parent for support of the children.

78-45-7.10
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(3) Multiply each parent's tentative base child
support obligation by the percentage of time the
children spend with the other parent to determine each parent's tentative obligation to the
other parent.
(4) Subtract from the products in Subsection
(3) the children's portion of any monthly payments made directly by each parent for medical
and dental insurance premiums.
(5) Calculate the base child support award to
be paid by the obligor by subtracting the lesser
amount calculated in Subsection (4) from the
larger amount.
(6) Allocate the combined work-related child
care costs of the parents equally to each parent to
obtain the other parent's tentative child care obligation.
(7) (a) Calculate the total child support award
that the parent determined to be the obligor
in Subsection (5) must pay when the obligee
has physical custody by:
(i) adding the base child support
award calculated under Subsection (5);
and
(ii) adding the amount of the child
care obligation allocated to the obligor
in Subsection (6).
(b) Calculate the total child support award
that the parent determined to be the obligor
in Subsection (5) must pay when that parent
has physical custody by:
(i) adding the base child support
award calculated under Subsection (5),
and
(ii) subtracting the amount of the
child care obligation allocated to the obligee in Subsection (6).
(8) Include the amounts determined in Subsections (7)(a) and (b) and the two total child support
awards m the child support order.
1990
78-45-7.10. R e d u c t i o n w h e n child becomes 18.
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age the base
combined child support award is automatically reduced to reflect the lower base combined child support obligation shown in the table for the remaining
number of children due child support, unless otherwise provided in the child support order.
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child
amount derived from the base child support award
originally ordered.
1989
78-45-7.11. Reduction for e x t e n d e d visitation.
<1) The child support order shall provide that the
base child support award be reduced by 50% for each
child for time periods during which the order grants
specific extended visitation for that child for at least
25 of any 30 consecutive days. Only the base child
support award is affected by the 50% abatement. The
amount to be paid for work-related child care costs
may be suspended if the costs are not incurred during
the extended visitation
(2) For purposes of this section the per child
amount to which the abatement applies shall be calculated by dividing the base child support award by
the number of children included in the award.
1990
78-45-7.12. Income in excess of tables.
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the
highest level specified in the table, an appropriate
and just child support amount may be ordered, but
the amount ordered may not be less than the highest
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level specified in the table for the number of children
due support.
1939
78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership
and functions.
(1) On or before May 1, 1989 and May 1, 1991. and
then on or before May 1 of every fourth year subsequently, the governor shall appoint an advisory committee consisting of:
(a) two representatives recommended by the
Office of Recover>* Services;
(b) two representatives recommended by the
Judicial Council;
(c) two representatives recommended by the
Utah State Bar Association; and
(d) an uneven number of additional persons,
not to exceed five, who represent diverse interests related to child support issues, as the governor may consider appropriate. However, none of
the individuals appointed under this subsection
may be members of the Utah State Bar Association.
(2) (a) The advisory committee shall review the
child support guidelines to ensure their application results in the determination of appropriate
child support award amounts.
(b) The committee shall report to the Legislative Judiciary Interim Committee on or before
October 1 in 1989 and 1991, and then on or before October 1 of every fourth year subsequenth
(c) The committee's report shall include recommendations of the majority of the committee, as
well as specific recommendations of individual
members of the committee.
(3) The committee members serve without compensation. Staff for the committee shall be provided from
the existing budgets of the Department of Human
Services and the Judicial Council. The committee
ceases to exist no later than the date the subsequent
committee under this section is appointed.
1990
78-45-7.14. Child s u p p o r t obligation table.
The following is the Base Combined Child Support
Obligation Table:
BASE COMBINED CHILD SUPPORT
OBLIGATION
(Both Parents)
(Adjusted for FICA, and federal and state taxes 1
Monthly
Combined
Adj Gross
Income

1
Less
than
$200 $20

200
225
250
275
300
325
350
375

23
25
28
51
56
60
65
69
-.00 74
425 78
450 83
475 87
500 92
525 96
550 100
575 105
600 109
625 114
650 118
675 123
700 127

Children

2

3

4

5

6

7

$28
34
38
42
67
73
78
84
90
96
102
108
114
120
126
131
137
143
149
155
161
167

$30
35
39
43
67
73
79
85
91
97
103
109
115
121
127
133
139
145
151
157
162
168

$31
35
39
43
68
74
80
86
92
98
104
110
116
122
128
134
140
146
152
158
164
170

$32
36
40
44
69
75
81
87
93
99
105
111
117
123
129
135
141
148
154
160
166
172

$33
36
40
45
69
76
82
88
94
100
106
112
118
125
131
137
143
149
155
161
167
174

$34
37
41
46
70
76
83
89
95
101
107
113
120
126
132
138
144
150
157
163
169
175

8

9

10

$35
38
42
47
71
84
85
90
% 97
102 103
108 109
114 116
121 122
127 128
133 135
139 141
146 147
152 153
158 160
164 166
171 172
177 179

$36
39
42
4S
71
So

$35
38
41
46
70
S3
83
89

<y6

91
9S
104
110
117
123
129
136
142
149
155
161
168
174
180
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Monthh
C-^mbineo
-\d' G r o ^
Income
1

4

Children
5
6

10

57255132 S173 $174 $176 $178 $180 $181 $183 $185 $187
75U 136 178 180 182 184 186 188 189 191 193
190 192 194 196 198 199
775 141
184
186 1«*
1%
>riij 1 4 5
190
192 194
198 200 202 204 206
•>22 224 226 228 230 233
^25 16" 214 218 220
^5<J 16- 220 229 233 235 237 239 242 245 247
-75 16* 226
245 247 250 252 255 259 262
241
260 263 266 269 273
^•U 17 i 1U
252 25*
J
2 5 172 2*8 263 270 273 276 279 283 287 292
^50 173 244 275 283 2»5 288 292 296 301 307
Q75 174 250 286 295 29i 301 305 310 315 321
. »H)0 176 256 298
J08 311 314 318 323 329 336
1 u50 17* 268 321 333 336 340 345 350 357 366
: :oo i8i 2*0 344 358 362 366 371 378 386 395
. 150 183 292 367 3 S3 387 392 397 405 414 425
1 2o0 184 296 379 399 404 410 417 425 436 448
1 250 165 304 390 413 423 432 442 452 463 477
1 300 19o 312 400 426 441 454 466 478 491 505
1 350 195 320 410 442 460 476 491 505 519 534
. - *> 2CK< 323 421 457 479 49.b 515 531 547 562
. -50 205 336 431 471 497 520 540 558 575 591
516 542 564 584 602 620
. -<>0 210 345 441 4*6
-50 215 353 452 501 535 564 589 611 630 645
i *no 219 361 462 515 554 586 613 637 658 677
1 o30 224 369 473 530 572 608 638 664 686 705
" *0 229 377 483 544 591 630 663 690 714 734
. "V> 234 3s5 493 559 610 652 687 717 742 763
I ^ O 239 393 504 574 625 674 712 743 769 791
654 702 742 775 802 825
i -50 252 403 522 595
416 532 606 665 715 755 789 817 840
1 svO 256
423 541 617 677
769 804 832 856
1 rSO 259
728
425 546 627 667
771 806 835 859
2<-0 262
738
701
432 557 637
798 835 865 890
2 loO 265
754
725
659
825 863 895 921
576
750
i 2<"«» 267
749
853 892 925 952
595 650
505
2 3«.«J 2"5
772
860 921 955 983
614 7o2
631
2 400 283
73e
715
899 942
977 1.006
625
649
737
927 970
1,007 1,037
644
290
612 675
753
954 999
1,037 1.06*
663
536 903
767
866 932 968 1,034 1,073 1,105
669
2 >«J 313
809
590 959 1.016 1,063 1,103 1,136
321
708
831
728
915 9b5 1.043 1.092 1,133 1.167
3«--J 330
853
747
939 1.011 1,071 1,121 1,163 1,197
^ 1"0 339
12** 343 592 766 875 963 1.037 1098 1,150 1,192 1,225
3 3«' 357 6<»7 766 897 96S 1,063 1,126 1,179 1,222 1,259
3 4o0 366 622 805 920 1,012 1.069 1,154 1,207 1,252 1,290
3 500 375 637 624 942 1036 1,115 1,181 1,236 1,282 1,320
3 6-\» 384 6-53 844 964 1.061 1.142 1.209 1,265 1,312 1,351
3 7C-J 393 668 863 986 1.085 1.166 1.237 1.294 1,342 1,362
3 ^ *"> 402 683 882 1,006 1 109 1.194 1.264 1,323 1,372 1,412
J9"J 4I9
706 909 1,036 1.142 1.226 1,300 1,360 1,410 1,452
4 0f^ 427 720 928 1,060 1.166 1.254 1.328 1.389 1,440 1,483
4 100 435 735 947 1,082 1 190 1.280 1,355 1,418 1,470 1,514
4 2C- 443 749 966 1,103 1.214 1.306 1,383 1,447 1,501 1,545
i 3v> 451 7*4 985 1,125 1.235 1332 1,411 1,476 1,531 1,576
4 4 X 459 775 1,004 1,147 1 262 1.358 1,438 1,505 1,561 1,606
4 >00 477 502 1032 1,177 1.295 1.393 1.475 1,543 1,600 1,648
4 *u0 485 616 1.050 1,199 1.319 1,419 1.502 1,572 1,630 1.679
4 70>» 493 831 1.069 1,221 1,343 1.445 1,530 1,601 1,661 1,710
4 SvO 501 ^45 1.088 1,243 1,367 1.471 1.55S 1,630 1.691 1,741
4 900 509 560 1.107 1.264 1,391 1.497 1.585 1,659 1,721 1,773
5 000 517 674 1.126 1,286 1.415 1.523 1.613 1.688 1,751 1,804
5100 525 669 1.145 1,308 1.439 1.549 1.641 1,717 1,781 1,835
5 200 534 903 1.164 1,329 1.463 1.575 1,668 1,746 1,812 1,866
5 300 564 939 1,203 1,372 1308 1,621 1,716 1,795 1.861 1,916
5 400 570 951 1.220 1,391 1.529 1.644 1.740 1,820 1,886 1,942
5 500 577 963 1.236 1,410 1,550 1,666 1,763 1,844 1,912 1,968
5 600 583 976 1.252 1,429 1,571 1.689 1,787 1,869 1,937 1,994
5 700 590 968 1.269 1,448 1.592 1.712 1,811 1,894 1,963 2,020
5 500 596 1.001 1.285 1,467 1.613 1.734 1.835 1,919 1,988 2.046
5 900 603 1,013 1.302 1.485 1.634 1757 1.859 1,943 2,014 2,072
6o00 609 1,025 1.318 1,504 1,655 1.780 1.883 1,968 2,039 2,097
6100 616 1,038 1334 1,523 1,676 1.802 1.907 1,993 2,064 2,123
6 200 622 1,050 1,351 1,542 1,697 1.825 1331 2,018 2,090 2,149
6 300 630 1.062 1367 1,561 1,718 1347 1354 2,042 2,115 2.175
6 400 637 1,075 1.383 1,580 1,739 1.869 1.997 2,067 2,140 2 3 0 1
6.500 651 1,094 1.407 1,606 1.766 1399 2.008 2,098 2,172 2.233
6.600 658 1,107 1.423 1.624 1,787 1,921 2,031 2,122 2,197 2,259
6.700 665 1,119 1.439 1,643 1308 1343 2.055 2,146 2.222 2 3 8 5
2,078 2,171 2,247 2,310
6 800 673 1.132 1.455 1,662 1,828 1.965
2,101 2,195 2 3 7 2 2,336
6.900 680 1.144 1.472 1.681 1,849 1.987
2,125 2,219 2 3 9 7 2,361
2.010
7.000 687 1.157 1.488 1,699 1370
2,148 2,244 2,322 2 3 8 7
7.100 694 U 6 9 1.504 1.718 1390 2.032
2,171 2,268 2,347 2.412
7.200 701 1,181 1,520 1,736 1311 2,054
2.067 2.186 2 3 8 3 2,363 2,439
7 300 706 1,189 1,531 1,748 1323
2.081 2 3 0 0 2,298 2,379 2,445
7.400 710 1.197 1.541 1,760 1336
2.095 2315 2,314 2,395 2,462
7.500 715 1,205 1351 1,771 1349

78-45-7.17

Monthly
Combined
Adj Gross
Income
1
7,600 719
7.700 723
7,800 728
7,900 732
8,000 737
8.100 741
8.200 746
8,300 750
8.400 755
8,500 759
8.600 763
8,700 768
8,800 772
8,900 777
9.000 781
9.100 786
9,200 790
9,300 795
9,400 799
9.500 803
9,600 808
9,700 812
9,800 817
9.900 821
10.000 826

4
1.213
1.220
1,228
1,236
1.244
1.252
1.259
1,267
1,275
1.283
1.291
1,298
1.306
1314
1.322
1,330
1.337
1,345
1.353
1.361
1,369
1376
1,384
1.392
1,400

1.562
1.572
1.582
1,592
1,603
1,613
1,623
1,633
1,644
1,654
1,664
1.675
1,685
1,695
1,705
1,716
1,726
1,736
1,747
1,757
1,767
1,777
1,788
1,798
1,808

1,783
1.794
1,806
1,818
1,829
1.841
1.853
1.864
1,876
1,887
1,899
1,911
1,922
1,934
1,945
1,957
1,969
1,980
1,992
2,003
2,015
2,027
2,038
2,050
2,061

Children
5
6
1.962
1.975
1.987
2.000
2,013
2.026
2.039
2.052
2,064
2,077
2.090
2,103
2,116
2,129
2,141
2,154
2,167
2,180
2.193
2,206
2,218
2,231
2344
2.257
2,270

2,109
2,123
2,137
2,150
2,164
2 178
2,192
2,206
2,220
2,234
2,247
2,261
2,275
2,289
2.303
2,317
2,330
2,344
2,358
2,372
2.386
2,400
2.414
2,427
2 441

7
2.230
2.245
2 259
2.274
2.289
2.303
2.318
2.233
2,347
2,362
2,377
2.391
2.406
2,421
2,435
2,450
2,465
2,480
2 494
2.509
2,524
2,538
2.553
2.568
2,852

2.239
2.345
2,360
2,375
2 391
2.406
2,422
2,437
2.452
2 468
2,483
2,499
2,514
2,529
2,545
2.560
2,575
2,591
2.606
2 622
2.637
2 652
2,668
2683
2 699

9

10

2,411
2,427
2,443
2,459
2,475
2,491
2,507
2,523
2,539
2,555
2,571
2,587
2,603
2,619
2,635
2,650
2,666
2,682
2,698
2,714
2,730
2,746
2.762
2.778
2,794

2,478
2,495
2,511
2,528
2.544
2,560
2.577
2,593
2,610
2,626
2,643
2,659
2,676
2,692
2,708
2,725
2,741
2.758
2,774
2,791
2,807
2,824
2.S40
2.856
2,873
1990

78-45-7.15. Medical a n d d e n t a l expenses — Insurance.
(1) Only the costs of health and dental insurance
premiums for children are included in the base combined child support obligation table.
(2) Uninsured medical and dental expenses are not
included in the table. The child support order shall
require:
(a) the custodial parent to pay uninsured routine medical and dental expenses, including routine office visits, physical examinations, and immunizations; and
(b) both parents to share all other reasonable
and necessary uninsured medical and dental expenses in a ratio to be determined by the appropriate court or administrative agency.
(3) (a) If health insurance is available to both parents at a reasonable cost and the children would
gain more complete coverage by doing so, both
parents shall be ordered to maintain insurance
for the dependent children.
(b) If insurance is not available to both parents
at a reasonable cost or if no advantage to the
children's coverage would result, the parent who
can obtain the most favorable coverage shall be
ordered to maintain that insurance.
1990
78-45-7.16. Child c a r e e x p e n s e s — Expenses n o t
incurred.
(1) The monthly amount to be paid for reasonable
work-related child care costs actually incurred on behalf of the dependent children of the parents shall be
specified as a separate monthly amount in the order.
(2) If an actual expense included in an amount
specified in the order ceases to be incurred, the obligor may suspend making monthly payment of t h a t
expense while it is not being incurred, without obtaining a modification of the child support order. 1990
78-45-7.17. Child care costs.
(1) The need to include child care costs in the child
support order is presumed if the custodial parent is
working and actually incurring the child care costs.
(2) The need to include child care costs is not presumed, b u t may be awarded on a case by case basis if
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(ii) duration and depth of desire for custody;
(iii) ability to provide personal rather than surrogate care;
(IV) significant impairment of ability to function as a parent
through drug abuse, excessive drinking or other causes;
(v) reasons for having relinquished custody in the past;
(vi) religious compatibility with the child;
(vii) kinship, including in extraordinary circumstances stepparent
status;
(viii) financial condition;
(F) any other factors deemed important by the evaluator, the parties,
or the court.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
A>«ALYSIS
Use of evaluator's report
Cited

mit a written report to the court, thereby contemplating the use of such a report by a trial
court in child custod\ determinations Linam
v King, 804 P 2d 1235 (Utah Ct App 1991)

Use of evaluator's report
SubdiMsion (2) permits an evaluator to sub-

Cited in Merriam \ Merriam 799 P 2d 1172
(Utah Ct App 1990)

Rule 4-904. Repealed.
Repeals. — Rule 4-904. providing for the
promulgation of child support guidelines, was
repealed in 1989

Rule 4-905. Domestic pretrial conferences and orders.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for conducting pretrial conferences in
contested domestic matters.
To provide for uniformity in pretrial orders in contested domestic matters.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the district courts which have court commissioners.
S t a t e m e n t of t h e Rule:
(1) Court commissioners shall conduct pretrial conferences in all contested
matters seeking divorce, annulment, paternity or modification of a decree of
divorce.
(2) At the pretrial conference, the commissioner shall discuss the issues
with counsel and the parties, may receive proffers of evidence, and may receive evidence if authorized to do so by the presiding district judge.
(3) Following the pretrial conference, the commissioner shall issue a pretrial order which shall include:
(A) the issues stipulated to by the parties;
(B) the issues which remain in dispute; and
(C) the commissioner's recommendations as to the disputed issues.
(4) The commissioner may designate one of the parties' counsel to reduce
the pretrial order to writing pursuant to Rule 4-504.
993
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(5) The disputed issues identified in the pretrial order shall remain at issue
for purposes of trial.
(Added effective March 31, 1992.)
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